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COOPERATIVE CONDITIONAL ADVERTISING AGREEMENTS:
THE REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONALLY EQUAL TERMS
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Basil J. Mezines*
The purpose of advertising is to sell goods, services or ideas to large groups
of prospective purchasers. The advertiser has at his command a large variety
of media to transmit his message. These media (newspapers, TV, magazines,
radio, outdoor advertising, motion pictures, direct-mail advertising, catalogues
and many others), differ widely in form, characteristics and fields of effective-
ness.' The advertiser has not been trained to deal with perplexing or even
ordinary Robinson-Patman Act problems, but by education and experience he
has been trained to select the advertising vehicle that will produce the most
sales.2
A seller or businessman is concerned with sales and the vitality of his busi-
ness. The Robinson-Patman Act, however, is concerned with the vitality of
competition generally. A seller's vigorous promotional policy which does not
take into account the provisions of the act may result in difficulties. Although
the act does permit a seller a wide choice of media and approaches to advertising
and other promotional programs, complete freedom of action is denied him.
Nevertheless, under the act a seller may pursue a program that will meet the
needs and preferences of his retail or wholesale customers, which in turn pro-
duce sales for all parties concerned.
Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act deals with the payment of
advertising allowances to customers, and 2(e) deals with the furnishing of
services or facilities to customers.' Under section 2(d) it is unlawful for a seller
to make payments to a customer for sales services unless the payments are
proportionally available to all competing customers. Section 2(e) makes it
unlawful for the seller to render sales services to persons who buy for resale
* Member, District of Columbia Bar, Maryland Bar; A.B., George Washington Univer-
sity, 1946; LL.B., George Washington University Law School, 1948; Senior Trial Attorney,
Bureau of Restraint of Trade, Federal Trade Commission. The opinions expressed in this article
do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Trade Commission.
1 ALEXANDER, SURFACE, ELDER AND ANDERSON, MARKETING 467-72 (1940); CONVERSE,
HUEGY AND MITCHELL, ELEMENTS OF MARKETING 636-38 (1952).
2 See authorities cited supra note 1. For an excellent discussion of the ramifications of
false or misleading advertising, see Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Com-
mission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548 (1964).
3 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), 13(e) (1964). Section 2(d) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract
for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such per-
son in the course- of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any
services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manu-
factured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration
is available on proportionally equal terms to all other.customers competing in the dis-
tribution of such products or commodities.
Section 2(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or
without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the
furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale,
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unless these services are proportionally available to all buyers. Both sections
view the buyer and seller as a team interested in promoting the sale of goods
to the ultimate consumer.
The act was primarily designed to prevent and eliminate price discrimina-
tion and is not concerned with promotional programs as such. Such programs
were subjected to legal strictures because discrimination may take place by a
seller favoring one customer with a discount in the form of an advertising allow-
ance while denying such treatment to others. For example, one widely used
vehicle is cooperative advertising - a joint undertaking by the seller and his
customer which is designed to increase the sales of both. However, as in any
other advertising venture, the success of such a program may depend as much
on the nature of the purchaser's "image" as it does on the nature of the
advertisement. A Bergdorf image may, in fact, be more important to a manu-
facturer than his own brand name. The result may be that a manufacturer
prefers to channel his cooperative advertising to retailers whom he believes
can do more for his product than other, less well-known retailers.
It is at this point that a conflict between business needs and legal demands
arises. Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act require that all
competing purchasers be permitted to share in the benefits of cooperative
advertising program on "proportionally equal terms."
There is little difficulty in determining violations when a seller secretly
grants cooperative advertising payments to a few favored customers.4 However,
consider the case of Kay Windsor,5 a dress manufacturer which devised a pro-
motional program designed to present its line of dresses as prestige garments
through advertisements early in the season at only the better department stores.
To effectuate this program, it became necessary to offer these department stores
an advertising allowance while withholding it from competing customers. The
FTC found that Windsor had violated 2 (d) by its program of selective allow-
ances. Windsor was motivated by the fact that the large department stores
were better suited to promote its dresses rather than the smaller, less pretentious
or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all
purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
The Federal Trade Commission Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandis-
ing Payments and Services describes the two sections as follows:
Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Act deal with discriminations in the field of pro-
motional services made available to purchasers who buy for resale. Where the seller
pays the buyer to perform the service, Section 2(d) applies. Where the seller furnishes
the service itself to the buyer, Section 2(e) applies. Both sections require a seller to
treat his competing customers on proportionally equal terms.
1 TRADE REG. REP. 3980, at 6072-73 (1960).
4 The primary legislative purpose in enacting §§ 2(d) and 2(e) was to stop price discrim-
inations concealed as promotional payments. 80 CONG. REc. 6282, 7759, 9418 (1936).
For typical cases involving "payment" arrangements subject to § 2(d) see, e.g., Atalanta
Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958); Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
17311 (F.T.C. July 29, 1965); Lovable Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17282 (F.T.C. June 29,
1965); Act Books, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 17273 (F.T.C. June 18, 1965); Flotill Prods.,
Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16970 (F.T.C. June 26, 1964); General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C.
798 '(1956).
For typical "service" cases under § 2(e) see, e.g., Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 360 U.S.
55 (1959); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Dantzler
v. Dictograph Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1959); Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. FTC,
144 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
5 Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89 (1954).
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stores. Nevertheless, this promotional assistance gave the favored stores a defi-
nite advantage over other customers.
More difficulty is engendered when the seller makes a payment which can
only be taken advantage of by a few customers, but which is, in fact, theoretically
available to all.6 While Congress may have been concerned with the seller's
desires and the benefit obtained by him from cooperative promotional payments,
it was even more concerned with the benefit such payments confer on that
seller's customers.7 The seller is not free to consider only the implications of
the benefit he receives. Rather, he must ensure that if any of his payments
confer a benefit upon one class of competing customers, the same benefit -or,
as some cases hold, an equivalent benefit - must be conferred on all. This
position is exemplified by the Seventh Circuit's decision in State Wholesale
Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.' In this private suit, a number of
6 Typical arrangements of this kind were involved in the following: Shreveport Macaroni
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 971 (1964); Vanity
Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962); Transogram Co., 61 F.T.C. 629
(1962). Buyer violations arising from the receipt and inducement of such illegal payments are
illustrated by: Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
910 (1963); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 824 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 '(2d Cir. 1962).
7 Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 486-87 (2d Cir. 1962), involved
payments for newspaper advertising to Weingarten, a preferred customer. The court pointed
out that: "[S]ince Weingarten would have had to furnish more newspaper advertising than its
competitor, respondent would have derived greater benefit from the larger payment. ... But
Weingarten would have received an enormously greater benefit from respondent than the equal-
ly entitled competitor." Thus, the court looked at the benefit accruing to the favored buyer in
declaring that the standard of proportional equality was not satisfied.
Moreover, in P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439, 444 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 927 (1960), the court stated that: "[This section of the Act [2(d)] does not concern itself
with motive or intention. It is only concerned with the consequences which flow from an act.
If those consequences eventuate, the act from which they result is forbidden."
This case involved a tripartite agreement whereby suppliers of retail food stores had made
payments to broadcasting companies for the benefit of certain such stores, "to the favored cus-
tomers for said customers' own advertising purposes." The broadcasting companies first con-
tracted with the retail chains to conduct in-store promotional displays of products for free
network time. The networks then sold time to suppliers, offering as an inducement the in-
store promotion already contracted for with the chains.
Payments to a third party were also involved in Swanee Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). The court held that payments made by a
seller of paper products to the owner of a "spectacular" sign at Times Square were made for the
benefit of the chain store customer, Grand Union, "in consideration for . . . services rendered
'by and through' the customer." Since such piyments were not made available on proportionally
equal terms to other customers § 2(d) was held to have been violated. In this case, Grand
Union had leased the sign space and then induced Swanee to pay the cost. Here, the lease of
the sign by Grand Union was contingent upon participation by the supplier. For this reason,
the court suggested that this case was stronger than the "Chain Lightning" case, P. Lorillard
Co. v. FTC, supra, because there the agreements were not contingent upon participation by the
supplier.
What is significant is that the court In both cases viewed the separate agreements as one
and focused its attention on the benefit flowing to certain favored customers of the suppliers. In
this connection, in a very recent statement regarding three-party promotional plans devised by
neither a supplier nor a customer but a hopeful intermediary, the Commission stated:
Even though an intermediary is employed, it remains the supplier's responsibility to
make certain that each of the supplier's customers who compete with one another
in reselling his products is offered either an opportunity to participate in the pro-
motional assistance plan on proportionally equal terms or a suitable alternative if
the customer is unable as a practical matter to participate in the plan; if not, the
supplier, the retailer, and the promoter participating in the plan may be acting in
violation of Section 2(d) or (e) of the Clayton Act and/or Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
FTC News Release, Sept. 21, 1965.
8 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959).
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retail grocers and two wholesalers sued General Foods, Hunt Foods, Morton
Salt and A & P, charging that advertising placed by the first three suppliers
in a magazine owned by A & P, Women's Day, violated various sections of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The district court held that the suppliers violated
section 2(d) because similar advertising was not made available to all other
customers. The defendants had argued successfully in the lower court that the
purchases of advertising in Women's Day were based on the advertising value
of the publication and had no relation to the fact that A & P was a large pur-
chaser of these suppliers. The court concluded that the evidence "clearly reveals
that the defendant suppliers receive full value for their payments for their adver-
tisements in Women's Day."9 The court added that:
... [P]laintiffs do not publish or sell a store distributed magazine and, thus,
they are unable and unequipped to render or furnish the services for which
payment would be made and for which the defendant suppliers in this
case pay Women's Day. Being so unable to furnish these services, plaintiffs
have no standing to complain about the defendant suppliers' advertising
in Women's Day even if it were assumed that these payments violated the
Act.Y
On appeal, the court viewed the transactions realistically and was concerned
with the position in the market place of grocers competing with A & P that
did not own publications like Women's Day. Rather than look to the benefit
accruing to the suppliers, the court focused its attention on the detriment to the
unfavored buyers by stating:
In determining the proportionally equal terms upon which a seller
shall make available any payment or consideration referred to in 2(d),
the Act requires a frank recognition of the business limitations of each
buyer. An offer to make a service available to one, the economic status
of whose business renders him unable to accept the offer, is tantamount
to no offer at all.1
Thus, unintentional denial of promotional payments is placed on the same
plane as intentional or concealed payments. Nor does it matter that the seller's
decision resulting in the favoritism was based on the demands of his business.
The court did not believe that a promotional program could be tailormade or
devised so as to exclude certain customers from participation. In short, if the
peculiar characteristics of a customer's business put the seller's offer out of the
reach of that customer, then the seller is required to devise an alternative plan.
The most difficult questions arise when'the seller openly announces a plan
which he intends to offer to all customers, places limits on participation which
deny the use of one feature of the plan to some customers but at the same time
offers an "alternative" to those customers. In this situation, the knotty problem
of the meaning of the term "on proportionally equal terms" is squarely raised.
All customers can participate and all can receive payments - yet it must be
9 154 F. Supp. 471, 478 (N.D. Il. 1957).
10 Id. at 483.
11 258 F.2d 831, 839 "(7th Cir. 1958).
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asked whether all customers are being fairly treated. True, all can participate
-but can they participate "on proportionally equal terms"?
One position that can be taken is that if some customers cannot take
advantage of the most desirable features of a plan, no "alternative" is possible.
The court in Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC," came close to so holding by flatly
rejecting the contention of a cosmetic manufacturer that the demonstrator
service offered to certain department store customers was of a kind that could
not be proportionalized. The Commission had found that:
The furnishing of a service or facility which cannot be proportionalized
... so as to make it reasonably possible for competing purchasers to avail
themselves of such services or facilities if they desire to do so, constitutes
a failure to accord such services or facilities upon proportionally equal
terms.13
Consistent with this opinion the Commission's order included a paragraph spe-
cifically prohibiting failure to proportionalize demonstrator services.'"
Of course, it can be argued that, since no alternatives were offered by re-
spondent to its unfavored customers, the question of the legality of offering
them alternatives was neither raised nor answered. However, the language
quoted above comes perilously close to announcing that a seller must propor-
tionalize every single feature of a plan and cannot offer alternatives. In other
words, complete freedom of choice must be offered to the purchaser."
However, the Commission shortly thereafter, in approving trade practice
conference rules for the cosmetic industry, amplified its views in Arden by sanc-
tioning a promotional program offering alternative services of "equivalent mea-
surable cost" and suitable to the customer whenever the same promotional arrange-
ment was not suitable to all customers.'
6
The doctrine of reasonable alternatives was fully adopted by the Com-
mission in Lever Bros. Co. where in dismissing the case it emphasized that any
merchandising program "must be honest in its purpose and fair and reasonable
in its application."' 7 Lever Brothers had a program in which its customers
12 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), affiring 39 F.T.C. 288 (1944), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
806 (1947).
13 39 F.T.C. 288, 302 (1944).
14 Id. at 305.
15 See Trade Practice Rules for the Cosmetic and Toilet Preparation Industry, 4 TRADE
REo. REP. 141221 (1951); EDwARs, THE PaRcE DIScRImINATION LAW 169 (1959); PATMAN,
COMPLETE GuIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 137-38 (1963).
16 Trade Practice Rules for the Cosmetic and Toilet Preparation Industry, 4 TRADE REo.
REP. 1 41221 (1951).
See EDwARDs, op. cit. supra note 15, at 169, wherein it is opined that the Arden case as
precedent has been clouded by the Rules because:
[T]he Commission abandoned the principle of its Arden decision that any service offered
to anyone must be proportionately available to all. Instead it adopted the view that
the services offered to different customers may be of different kinds, if, in the aggre-
gate, the group of services available to various customers satisfies the test of propor-
tionality.
Similarly, Representative Patman described the Rules as a "retreat" from the "acceptable
standards approved by the courts for determining the meaning of the phrase 'proportionally
equal terms.'" He said "this relaxation stemmed from ... the Commission pronouncing that any
method or plan that is found to be 'suitable' or 'equitable'" satisfies the statute. PATMAN, op. Cit.
supra note 15, at 137-38.
17 50F.T.C.494,512 (1953).
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could avail themselves of newspaper advertisements, handbill promotions or
indoor display alone. The program authorized reimbursement from 122 cents
to 20 cents per case for newspaper advertising, an allowance of 8 cents to 9
cents per case for handbill promotions and only 6 cents for indoor displays.
Although small customers failed to earn the highest cooperative payment for
newspaper advertising, the Commission found that newspaper advertising was
more expensive. The Commission adopted the following finding of the hearing
examiner:
There is no evidence in this record to support a finding that even
the highest rate of payment offered by respondent for feature sales, includ-
ing newspaper advertising, is not reasonably available to all of respondent's
customers. The customer can avail himself of this rate either through use
of the annual contract by advertising one or more products three times
each contract period of four months, or on such products which he cares
to advertise through the Cooperative Merchandising Plan with only one
insertion of the advertisement. The respondent places no restrictions on
the newspapers which he may use except that it [sic] cover the area where his
store or stores are located thus enabling the use of neighborhood papers
or weekly or monthly papers at a greatly reduced rate. The respondent
has accepted as low as 2 or 3 lines of advertising as compliance with the
contract which reduces the advertising expense. In the absence of evidence
that respondent has refused or withheld its annual contract from customers
for not advertising all of its products or a substantial number thereof, it
must be assumed that even a customer executing the annual contract could,
if he so desired, participate by advertising only one or more products as
his financial condition or needs might dictate.' s
Thus, the Commission made a finding that for all practical purposes the
higher rate newspaper allowances were in fact available to all customers. This,
coupled with the alternative forms of promotional participation offered, satis-
fied the Commission that the requirements of the act were met. Hence, this
case should not be construed as permitting a supplier to pay more for one type
of promotion than another where some customers may be unable to use the
higher paying promotional program.' Any other interpretation would com-
pletely frustrate the intent of the act to eliminate discrimination.
For example, assume a seller has two programs, one of which entitles the
customer to reimbursement at 5 percent of the dollar volume of purchases
during a specified time, and another which provides for reimbursement at 10
percent. If the latter program paying the higher allowance is not available to
a customer because "the economic status of" his "business renders him unable
to accept the offer," it "is tantamount to no offer at all." This is precisely what
18 Id. at 509-10.
19 See BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: SUMMARY AND COMMENT 63 (1964), wherein
the author states that: "Lever Brothers cannot be read broadly. Rather it must be considered in
the light of certain express caveats and the facts."
However, a contrary view is expressed in RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 408 (1962): "[IThe FTC rejected the contention that a supplier's
payments for diverse forms of advertising must be at a uniform rate, and instead sanctioned more
favorable reimbursement terms for newspaper advertising as compared with handbills or store
display."
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the court was referring to in State Wholesale Grocers.2" Precise quantitative
proportionality occurs when all customers receive the same percentage based
on their purchases.
This approach has been followed by the FTC in its Guides for Advertising
Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, which states that
to ensure proportional equality the plan "may require offering all customers
more than one way to participate in the plan," and where "the seller has alter-
native promotional plans, his customers must be given the opportunity to choose
among the plans."'" But the FTC warns that the "best" method of ensuring
proportionality is "by basing the payments made or the services furnished on
the dollar volume or on the quantity of goods purchased during a specified
time."2 Thus, it is clear that the position which seems to have been adopted
in Lever Bros. is no longer honored by the Commission.23
Yet, many difficulties are encountered when the legality of a plan which
offers alternatives is questioned - what is a "reasonable alternative"? The
Lever Bros. case has been read as permitting an alternative under which a
lesser payment can be made to a purchaser who uses an advertising medium
which is less desirable than newspaper advertising.
If Lever Bros. does stand for this proposition, it is doubtful that the same
result would occur today for still another reason. Aside from the criteria
20 258 F.2d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 1958).
21 1 TRADE REG. REP. 3980, Rule 9 (1960).
22 Id., Rule 7.
23 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953). Chairman Dixon, commenting on the decision in Vanity Fair
Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962), stated that:
Mhe company's "policy" of participating in special promotional events sponsored
by its customers requiring only that the payments requested by those customers be
"reasonably related to the cost of the services to the customer[s]" fell short of 2(d)'s
requirements ... [because] it established no workable basis for making the payments
',proportionally equal." It simply permitted each buyer to devise and propose his own
individualized promotional plan, and request payments that were reasonably related
to the amount he proposed to spend. No other limitations, such as, for example, "up
to 5% of the buyer's purchases" from respondent, were set out. Under such a "plan,"
of course, one buyer might receive promotional payments equal to only 2% of his
purchases from Vanity Fair, while a competitor across the street was receiving, say,
10%.
Dixon, Significant New Commission Developments 23-24 (August 12, 1963).
Former Chairman Kintner has also recommended precise proportionality by the following
example:
Suppose that the Association Cosmetics Company distributes its line through the
Colossal Department Store and ten independent drug stores in Middletown. The
Colossal Department Store is the largest customer by a wide margin. Association
Cosmetics employs a traveling demonstrator and the Colossal Department Store has
asked for an all-day demonstration in its store. If Association Cosmetics accedes to
the request of the Colossal Department Store, it must make a proportionally equal
offer to the independent drug stores in Middletown who distribute its line in com-
petition with the Colossal Department Store. The offer to the drug stores need not be
the same as the offer to the Colossal Department Store. Association Cosmetics com-
plies with the Robinson-Patman Act if its offer is proportionally equal. Suppose that
Colossal Department Store has an annual volume of $10,000 in Association Cosmetics
products and that the value of the all-day demonstration is $100. The Tom Thumb
Drug Store across the street has an annual volume of $1,000 in Association Cosmetics
products. Association Cosmetics satisfies the requirements of the Robinson-Patman
Act if it offers the Tom Thumb Drug Store promotional services worth $10. Here the
offer to the independent drug store might take the form of a short personnel train-
ing program or the furnishing of a demonstration kit.
KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 76-77 (1964).
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of "quantitative" proportionality such a plan may not meet a second, related
requirement -that of "qualitative" proportionality. This can best be illustrated
by considering the example referred to by the Commission in Fred Meyer, Inc. 4
Suppose, for example, it is established that a particular product can be
promoted twice as effectively through one medium as another, e.g., $1
spent on newspaper advertising will produce twice as much in additional
sales as $1 spent in radio advertising of the product in question. Could it
then be said that a seller was distributing his money among his competing
buyers on "proportionally equal terms" if he proportioned the money itself
fairly but contracted with Buyer A to let him spend his share on the
superior medium (newspaper) while insisting that Buyer B spend his on
the inferior medium (radio)? We think not. Although they received the
same number of dollars (or proportionally the same) one would still be
getting an advantage over the other. The seller must not give the dollar
and then dilute its value by forbidding the recipient to use it in a manner
that is permitted to a competing buyer.
25
Some advertising plans limit participation in cooperative newspaper
advertising by insisting that the purchaser's advertisement contain a minimum
number of lines, that it contain the manufacturer's trademark or that it con-
tain a picture of the merchandise offered. For those who cannot pay for the
advertising demanded, it is doubtful that an alternative such as in-store dis-
plays is as satisfactory as newspaper advertising. Yet, are the manufacturer's
demands wholly unreasonable? Effective advertising may require that a picture
of the product be included. Of course, we must insist that, as a minimum, the
plan satisfy the test of quantitative proportionality. But a reasonable, balanced
approach to the question of qualitative proportionality must be taken. Perhaps
the test can be phrased in this way: Are the restrictions which the seller places
on participation a necessary adjunct to the effectiveness of the advertisement?
If so, lack of strict qualitative proportionality might well be tolerated. For
example, limitations based upon the requirement that a picture is necessary
in a newspaper advertisement for effective advertising seem reasonable. On the
other hand, as the example in Fred Meyer, Inc. illustrates, the seller must not
discriminate by deliberately limiting one class of customers to newspaper
advertising and the other class to radio advertising.
In the final analysis, where the seller imposes conditions that the customer
must meet in order to be eligible for participation, the test becomes one of rea-
sonableness. Certainly, a supplier should not be required to contribute to his
customer's advertising if it debases the former's product. Some protection is
provided by the act's proviso which insures the traditional right of sellers of
24 Fred Meyer, Inc., 3 TRADE. REG. REP. 16368 (F.T.C. March 29, 1963).
25 Id. at 21225. The Commission held that Fred Meyer, a supermarket chain, violated § 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act by inducing suppliers to grant promotional assistance to
the chain's annual coupon book promotion for four weeks each fall. It was agreed between
Meyer and the suppliers participating that during this period similar promotional assistance
would not be granted to competing grocers. Thus, the Commission concluded that:
[Ihe suppliers in question would not have been in compliance with Section 2(d)
if they had given to respondent's competitors a sum of money proportionally equal to
that received by respondents, but conditioned it upon a promise by those other buyers
that they would not use the money in sponsoring a "coupon book" promotion.
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"selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of
trade."26 But once a customer is selected the seller is under a duty to grant
promotional benefits on "proportionally equal terms." Therefore, a seller cannot
exculpate himself from the strictures of the act by arbitrarily imposing condi-
tions making it difficult for customers to participate in certain features of a
program.
An example of a unique promotional program attacked by Commission
counsel because it allegedly involved arbitrary conditions is the plan adopted by
the General Electric Company in 1959 to deal with discounters. 2  Greatly dis-
turbed by the low retail prices for its products, G.E. put into effect a cooperative
advertising plan providing that in order to qualify for an advertising allow-
ance the dealer's advertising must not disclose prices lower than those con-
tained in a schedule of minimum retail prices published by G.E. Alternatives
provided by the plan included the right to run advertisements showing no
price for the advertised product, or demonstrators, salesmen's incentive pay-
ments and point of sale aids. The hearing examiner held that the alterna-
tives did not "constitute adequate substitutes for effective competitive price
advertising.
28
As the case developed, complaint counsel argued that there were two classes
of unfavored customers. The first consisted of those who felt that "no price"
advertising was completely worthless and would not use it or any other feature
of the plan. As to these customers, the hearing examiner concluded that the
plan resulted in violation of section 2(d) because G.E. had effectively denied a
... substantial number of retailers the benefits of cooperative advertising pay-
ments unless they adhere in their advertising to a pricing schedule which is
not of their choosing or desire .... [The plan] is, in fact, one which they
cannot possibly use because of the highly competitive nature of their market.
This is not a proper basis for proportional availability under Section 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act. The restrictions in the plan make it effectively
unavailable to those retailers who wish to or must remain competitive price
wise on GE's products.
29
However, the hearing examiner's decision did not apparently refer to the
alleged discrimination incurred by a second class of customers. According to
complaint counsel, this class consisted of customers who did accept the "no price"
alternative offered by G.E. This alternative was accepted by many of those
whose selling price was lower than G.E.'s minimums-thus not qualifying
26 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). The Supreme Court in referring to
the proviso stated that "Section 2(a) codifies the rules of United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300 (1919), protecting the right of a person in commerce to select his 'own cus-
tomers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade.'" FTC v. Simplicity Pattern
Co., 360 U.S. 55, 64 (1959).
27 General Elec. Co. 3 TRAE REGo. REP. 1 16330 (F.T.C. March 1, 1963) (Initial Decision
summary), 3 TRADE REo. Ra P. 16817 (F.T.C. Feb. 28, 1964) (Order Dismissing Complaint).
The Commission issued a two-pronged complaint against respondent General Electric on
May 28, 1962, charging it with violations of § 2(d) of the amended Clayton Act for failure to
make promotional funds available on proportionally equal terms to competing customers, and
of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 '(1964),
dealing with unfair methods of competition based on respondent's cooperative advertising
program.
28 Id., Initial Decision at 21166.
29 Ibid.
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them for price advertising for which some customers whose selling prices coin-
cided with those minimums could qualify. Since G.E. made payments to all
customers who advertised and since such payments were based upon the same
percentage of purchases, G.E.'s plan, as to customers who advertised, satisfied
the requirements of quantitative proportionality. However, those customers who
did use the "no price" alternative testified that it was not as desirable as price
advertising."
It was argued before the Commission that the customers who were forced
to accept the "no price" alternative were discriminated against (despite the fact
that they received payments proportionally equal to the payments received by
those who used price advertising) since G.E. was, in effect, purchasing for
them a less desirable advertising medium. It was G.E.'s position that it should
not be required to subsidize loss leader advertising and that the plan provided
sufficient alternatives so that all dealers could participate in its benefits.
After hearing two oral arguments, the Commission "determined that the
record is not adequate to enable an informed determination on the merits."'"
Apparently, the Commission believed that complaint counsel did not carry the
burden of proof and that the record did not sufficiently disclose that the "no
price" advertisement was ineffective. 2
The disposition of the Commission to understand the needs of both the
seller and the buyer in formulating an effective promotional program was also
evident in two recent cases. These involved the use of minimum purchase require-
ments as a prerequisite to qualifying for an advertising allowance. In the Atlantic
Prods. Corp. case 3 the Commission found that the minimum purchase require-
ment imposed by that company, which required customers to purchase in excess of
1500 dollars over a six-month period before it could qualify for an allowance,
was tantamount to not making the allowance available to competing customers
on proportionally equal terms. The record in that case showed that 85 to 90
percent of Atlantic's customers did not purchase in excess of the minimum pur-
30 Ibid. The hearing examiner also concluded:
• . .GE has by means of the price limitations of its cooperative advertising plans
attempted to and has bolstered and stabilized the retail prices of its products at the
retail level. This has been accomplished by GE independently by promulgating its
plan through its Housewares Division which was adopted by the GESCO Division and
put into effect with its retail dealers, and also by agreement with its independent
distributors when they agreed to adopt the limitations and put them into effect with
their retail dealers.
Id., Initial Decision, Dkt. No. 8487, at 29.
31 Id., Order Dismissing Complaint at 21792. Commissioner MacIntyre did not concur
for the reason that he believes the Commission should have adjudicated the issues
involved here. It is his view that the public interest would be better served by the
Commission reaching and rendering a judgment in the disposition of this important
case. It is his understanding that this case is a forerunner of other like important
situations, the resolution of which will be required by the public interest.
Ibid.
32 Compare Commissioner Elman's dissenting statement on the FTC Opinion on Joint Ads:
Obviously, a joint advertisement by small retailers which does not quote selling
prices would be a waste of money. The owner of a comer grocery store is not inter-
ested in "institutional" advertising. That kind of advertising would hardly attract
business away from his larger rivals, whose ads invariably feature weekend specials
and the like.
5 TRADE REG. REP. 11 50183. See Hearings on H. Res. 13 Before Select Committee on Small
Business, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1963).
33 Atlantic Prods. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16676 (F.T.C. Dec. 13, 1963).
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chase requirement during the six-month period necessary to qualify for the allow-
ance. Thus, a relatively small percentage of customers were able to take advan-
tage of the program and these were, generally, the large customers. On the
other hand, in the Sunbeam case 4 the Commission found that the 440-dollar
single purchase minimum requirement in order to be eligible for an advertising
allowance was not a practical obstacle for participating since anyone advertising
Sunbeam products would have engendered substantial demand for the product
and would in turn have to stock a sufficient amount to satisfy this demand.
Here again, the Commission's decision was influenced by the fact that Sunbeam
made alternative promotional programs available to purchasers who did not fulfill
the minimum purchase requirement. However, the Commission found that the
alternative promotional material made available to the purchasers in qualifying
for the advertising allowance was equivalent in value to the advertising allow-
ances. 3
In sum, the Robinson-Patman Act does not specify how a seller should pro-
mote goods or on what basis payment should be made to customers who join in
such a program. The statute does permit a wide variety of promotional arrange-
ments and allows the seller to impose reasonable conditions before cooperative
assistance is granted to the customer, provided such limitations are related to
the requirements of effective promotion and not designed to discriminate among
customers.
34 Sunbeam Corp., 3 TRADE- REo. REP. 1 17178 (F.T.C. Jan. 11, 1965).
35 In Atlantic Prods. Corp., 3 TRAD REG. RhP. 11 16676 (F.T.C. Dec. 13, 1963), the Com-
mission refrained from issuing a cease and desist order because of its belief that the granting of
unlawful advertising allowances was widespread in the industry. The Commission instructed
that industrywide proceedings be instituted looking to the promulgation of trade regulation
rules. See Abby-Kent Co., 3 TADE REG. REP. 17310 '(F.T.C. Aug. 9, 1965); Chesebrough-
Ponds, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17007 (F.T.C. July 27, 1964); Max Factor & Co., 3 TRADE,
REG. REP. 1 16992 (F.T.C. July 22, 1964); Sperry-Rand Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16791
(F.T.C. Feb. 17, 1964).
For new ideas of enforcement see statement of Francis C. Mayer, Chief, Division of Dis-
criminatory Practices, What's New Robinson-Patman Wise? 27-29 (August 10, 1965); and
Rockefeller, The Federal Trade Commission's Potential For Making Purposeful Antitrust Policy,
24 FED. B.J. 541 (1964).
